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Truth up to the Date of Use as a Requirement
for a Section 10(a) Prospectus: The Implications
of SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.
The Securities Act of 1933 contains both full disclosure and anti-
fraud protection for investors; violations of each type of provision are
treated differently in the civil liability sections of the Act. In SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., however, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that untruths in prospectuses subject the seller not only
to antifraud liability under section 12(2), but also to section 12(1) lia-
bility for violation of the section 5(b)(2) prospectus delivery requirement.
The court also determined that the truth requirement it found in section
10(a) exists up to the time the prospectus is used. The author criticizes
the court's view, and suggests that the Manor approach would greatly
change current practice for disclosure of developments that occur after
the registration statement has become effective.
I. INTRODUCTIONS ECTION 5 (b) (2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)
provides that a prospectus meeting the requirements of section
10 (a) must precede or accompany the delivery of any security. Sec-
tion 10 (a) (1) requires only that a prospectus "contain the informa-
tion contained in the registration statement .... 21 From this lan-
guage it appears that the prospectus delivery requirement is met
if the prospectus delivered mirrors the registration statement (with
certain permitted exceptions),' or contains at least the information
' Securities Act § 5(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2) (1970):
It shall be unlawfull for any person, directly or indirectly -
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale,
unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements
of subsection (a) of section 10.
The term "prospectus," as used in the Securities Act, includes both the section 10
or "statutory" prospectus, see note 2 infra and accompanying text, and the general pro-
spectus, defined in section 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970), as "any prospectus,
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or tele-
vision, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security .... "
References to "the Act" and to section numbers refer to the Securities Act of 1933
unless another act is specified.
2 Securities Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (1) (1970). Continuing, sec-
tion 10(a) (1) excepts from the prospectus certain documents required in the regis-
tration statement. Section 10(a) also contains: paragraph 10(a) (2) - prospectus
requirements for securities of foreign governments; paragraph 10(a) (3) - an excep-
tion to paragraph (1) for prospectuses used more than 9 months after the effective
date of the registration statement; and paragraph 10 (a) (4) - authority to omit any
information required by the subsection if the SEC so provides by rule or regulation.
3 See note 112 infra.
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found in the registration statement. Further, no provision of the
Act requires that an effective registration statement be updated to
disclose material posteffective events,4 and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has consistently held that a registration
statement speaks only as of its effective date.5 In SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc.,6 however, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that section 10(a) (1) implicitly requires the pro-
spectus to be truthful and that section 5 (b) (2) is violated by use
of a would-be section 10 (a) prospectus that is materially misleading
by virtue of its failure to disclose posteffective events.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., offered 450,000 shares of its stock
for sale to the public.' Several representations made in the prospec-
tus and the registration statement later proved to be false. First,
the prospectus stated that the offering was on an "all or nothing"
basis: unless all shares were sold within a 60-day period, the offer-
ing would end, and all subscription funds would be returned. Sec-
ond, it stated that all subscribers' funds would be held in escrow
and that arrangements for the escrow had already been made. Third,
the registration statement indicated that shares would be sold for
cash only. Finally, by not containing statements to the contrary,
both the prospectus and the registration statement represented that
no special compensation would be given to participants in the distri-
bution.8 When these representations proved to be false, the SEC
sought an injunction pursuant to Securities Act section 20(b) 9 and
section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act)1O In affirming the district court," the court of appeals held 12
that the defendants had violated antifraud provisions of the Securi-
4 The structure of section 5 of the Act divides the registration process into three
periods: the period before the registration statement is filed (the prefiling period), the
waiting period, and the period after the registration statement becomes effective (post-
effective period). Posteffective events are those that occur after the effective date.
5E.g., Funeral Directors Mfg. & Supply Co., 39 S.E.C. 33, 35 (1959); Charles A.
Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 10 (1934). In certain circumstances the SEC does require the
registrant to undertake to file posteffective amendments to disclose later events. 1 L-
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 300-02 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
6458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
7 The 450,000 shares included 100,000 shares then held by stockholders.
8458 F.2d at 1088-94. Securities Act schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970), re-
quires that the registration statement set forth any variations in offering price (item
16) and all commissions or discounts paid to underwriters directly or indirectly (item
17). Through section 10 (a) (1) the prospectus must contain this information as well.
9 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
11340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
12458 F.2d at 1094-95.
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ties Act (section 17(a) ),13 the Exchange Act (section 10(b) ),14 and
Exchange Act Rules 10b-5 and 10b-9.' 5 Although the court needed
no other basis than findings of fraud to affirm the injunction, it went
on to hold that the section 5(b) (2) prospectus delivery require-
ment had also been violated . 6  In so doing, the court created in
section 10(a) the implicit requirements (1) that a prospectus be
truthful and (2) that it be truthful as of the date it is used."
The court's holding - that an untrue prospectus, though consis-
tent with the registration statement, violates the section 5 (b) (2) pro-
spectus delivery provision - will become most important when it
is taken up by purchasers in private actions. An untrue prospectus
might now give rise to liability under section 12 (1) of the Securities
Act, which provides relief for any section 5 violation.18 In addition,
the purchaser will still retain the traditional antifraud remedies.' 9
13 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
1415 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
15 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, -9 (1973).
The district court also found violations of Exchange Act § 15 (c) (2), 15 U.S.C. §
78o(c) (2) (1970), and SEC Exchange Act Rule 15c2-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4
(1973). These findings were not appealed. 458 F.2d at 1088 & n.1. For a discus-
sion of the Manor decision, see 71 MICH. L. REv. 591 (1973).
16458 F.2d at 1098-1100. While the court of appeals described Manor as a section
5 (b) (2) violation, the district court held it to be a violation of section 5 (b) (1). 340
F. Supp. at 934. Securities Act § 5(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1) (1970), provides
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly -
(1) to make use of any means or instruments for transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any
prospectus relating to any security with respect to which a registration state-
ment has been filed under this [Act], unless such prospectus meets the re-
quirements of section 10 ....
Sections 5 (b) (1) and 5 (b) (2) differ in that section 5 (b) (1) requires generally that
written offers take the form of a section 10 prospectus (either a section 10(a) or 10(b)
prospectus, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(a), (b) (1970)), unless - and this applies only in the
posteffective period - the written offer is accompanied or preceded by a section 10(a)
prospectus. See note 2 supra and text accompanying notes 39-41 infra. Section
5(b) (2) requires the use of a section 10(a) prospectus. Both sections are equally
applicable in Manor. Use of the non-section 10 prospectus (not accompanied or pre-
ceded by a valid section 10(a) prospectus) constituted a section 5(b) (1) violation;
delivery of the security prior to delivery of a valid section 10(a) prospectus violated
section 5 (b) (2).
17 It could equally be said that these requirements are implicit under section
5(b) (2); sections 5(b) (2) and 10(a) together comprise the prospectus delivery re-
quirements.
18 Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970), imposes liability for re-
scission or the equivalent in damages upon "any person who offers or sells a security
in violation of section 5," provided that the plaintiff purchased from the defendant.
See notes 27, 36 infra.
19The antifraud remedies include Securities Act §§ 11, 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 771(2), 77q(a) (1970); Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970);
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This added protection to investors causes an overlap of antifraud
and prospectus delivery provisions in the Act, with an attendant
reduction of the plaintiffs' burdens and defendants' defenses which
the Act explicitly provides under its private antifraud remedies. 0
Further, Manor may force the amendment of a registration state-
ment whenever a material event occurs in the posteffective period..21
II. TRUTHFULNESS AS A REQUIREMENT
FOR A 10(a) PROSPECTUS
The Manor court's decision to interject a truth requirement into
section 10(a) (1) has no real foundation in the language of that
section. -2  More importantly, this approach appears to conflict with
the scheme of the Securities Act. The Act is composed of two
separate branches of substantive requirements: (1) the registration
and prospectus control provisions (referred to as the full disclosure
provisions); and (2) the antifraud provisions.13  The Act is struc-
and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). (Other antifraud provisions,
not relevant here, are Exchange Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970), and state blue sky
securities laws.) Sections 11 and 12(2) are express civil liability provisions; implied
private rights of action have been recognized under Securities Act § 17 (a), which pro-
hibits fraud in the sale of securities, see Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), and SEC Exchange Act
Rule 10b-5, see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See notes 24-28
infra and accompanying text.
20 See notes 24-26 inira and accompanying text.
21 See notes 110-21 infra and accompanying text.
22 Section 10(a) contains no explicit requirement of truthfulness. Nor do SEC
rules, Securities Act schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970), the general or special in-
structions to SEC Form S-1, or the signature verification of form S-1 contain any re-
quirement of truth. Compare notes 60-65 infra and accompanying text.
The only requirement clearly within section 10(a) is the matching requirement,
that is, that the prospectus "contain the information contained in the registration state-
ment." The original section 10(a) (1) required the prospectus to contain the "same
statements" as the registration statement. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 10(a) (1),
48 Stat. 81, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (1) (1970). This provision was amended
in 1954 to avoid any implication that the language in the prospectus and the registration
statement had to be identical. No suggestion was made at that time or in 1933 that a
truth requirement be included. H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
23 The full title of the Act sets forth its two purposes: "An Act to provide full and
fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74.
The full disclosure provisions are contained in sections 5, 7, and 10, 15 U.S.C. §§
77e, 77g, 77j (1970). Section 7 prescribes the content of the registration statement;
section 10 is the analogous section for the prospectus. Section 5, the core of the Act,
dictates requirements of the offer-and-sale process in terms of these two documents. The
prohibition against fraudulent offers or sales, section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1970), functions independently of section 5. Section 17 and the civil antifraud rem-
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tured so that each set of provisions functions independently of the
other. In Manor, however, the court in effect intertwines these two
sets of provisions; in so doing it produces a result that appears un-
supportable in view of the overall statutory scheme.
The impact of the court's melding of the full disclosure-anti-
fraud dichotomy is best illustrated by section 12, which gives a rem-
edy to buyers of securities for violations of the full disclosure provi-
sions (section 12(1) ) and the private antifraud provision (section
12(2) ).24 Though the remedy is identical in either case - rescis-
sion or the equivalent in damages if the security has been resold25
- the basis for section 12(1) liability differs from that for section
12(2) liability. In addition, a section 12(2) action in fraud is sub-
ject to the defense of due diligence,20 while liability under section
12(1) for violating the full disclosure provisions is virtually abso-
lute.27 Thus the structure of section 12 indicates that the full dis-
edies, sections 11 and 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1970), comprise the anti-
fraud provisions. See note 19 supra.
24 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970):
Any person who -
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or
(2) offers or sells - security (whether or not exempted by the provisions
of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the bur-
den of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person pur-
chasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in
any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.
251d.
26 Id. The other antifraud provisions, section 17 (a) of the Securities Act and sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act, contain no explicit due diligence defenses, but most
decisions have required the plaintiff to show at least some lack of care on the part of
the defendant. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d
Cir. 1971), in which the court held that something more than negligence is necessary
in an action for a monetary award.
27 Professor Loss states:
The liability under § 12 (1) is virtually absolute. The plaintiff need only
allege and prove (1) that the defendant was a seller or, under § 15, a person
in control of a seller; (2) that the mails or some means of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce was used... in the offer or sale to the
particular plaintiff; (3) that the defendant failed to comply with either the
registration or the prospectus requirements; (4) that the action is not barred
by the statute of limitations; and (5) that adequate tender was made when
the plaintiff is seeking rescission.
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closure and antifraud provisions should not be merged.28
The legislative history of the Act also demonstrates that section
12(1) was not intended to reach misrepresentations in prospectuses.
The House Report specifically sets out the level of care expected
and the type of liability imposed for false or misleading statements
used in selling literature:
The committee emphasizes that these [civil] liabilities attach
only when there has been an untrue statement of material fact or
an omission to state a material fact in the registration statement or
the prospectus. . . . All who sell securities with such a flaw, who
cannot prove that they did not know -- or who in the exercise of
due care could not have known - of such misstatement or omis-
sion, are liable under [section 11 and subsection 12(2)].
• * * The responsibility imposed is no more nor less than that
of a trust. It is a responsibility that no honest banker and no hon-
est business man should seek to avoid or fear. To impose a lesser
responsibility would nullify the purposes of this legislation. To
impose a greater responsibility ... would unnecessarily restrain the
conscientious administration of honest business with no compen-
sating advantage to the public.2 9
Since section 12(1) by its terms imposes virtually absolute liability,
it is clear that Congress did not intend sales made through false
or misleading statements to be addressed by this subsection. Indeed,
The only defense then available to the defendant is to allege and prove
that the particular security or transaction was exempt from § 5. The seller's
intent and knowledge of the violation . . . are entirely irrelevant in an action
under § 12(1).
3 Loss 1693 (footnotes omitted).
28 There are other distinctions between section 12(1) actions and actions based on
the two civil antifraud provisions of the Securities Act: section 11 and section 12(2).
(Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), imposes civil liability for a false registra-
tion statement on the issuer, those persons intimately involved with the issuer, the un-
derwriters, and those persons who participated in the preparation of or who signed the
registration statement.) The group of people who can be defendants under section
12(1) is likely to include people who may not be defendants in actions based upon
sections 11 or 12(2). The section 11 defendant group is limited to the issuer (and
its directors), underwriters, and those who participated in the preparation of or who
signed the registration statement. Section 12(2) is limited by its "by means of' lan-
guage to those people who participated in both the sale and the misrepresentations.
Section 12 (1), however, would appear to require only that the defendants have partici-
pated in the sale. But cf. note 36 infra. Also, the statute of limitations, Securities Act
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), is one year after the violation of section 12(1), but
one year after the discovery of the violation (or one year after discovery should have
been made) for section 11 or 12(2). This statute of limitations will usually work to
the disadvantage of plaintiffs under section 12(1), but if the fraud should have been
discovered before delivery of the section 10 prospectus, the statute begins to run sooner
for section 12 (2).
29 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). In place of the bracketed
language contained in the first paragraph of the quotation, the House Report uses the
phrase "sections 11 and 12." But the context makes it clear that the reference is not
to section 12 in its entirety, but only subsection 12 (2).
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'if an untruth in a prospectus gives rise to a section 5 violation and
the absolute liability of section 12(1), then the committee's express
intent, to permit due diligence defenses and to require lack of plain-
tiff's knowledge in cases of misstatements or half-truths, is negated.
Commentary on the Act has recognized the disclosure-antifraud
dichotomy. Professor Schulman stated in a 1933 article:
The first part of Section 12 does not deal with the truth or falsity
of the representations in the registration statement or prospectus.
It puts upon the seller only the burden of ascertaining the existence
of a registration statement and the conformity of the prospectus
with that statement.30
Later, Professor Loss noted:
[Pjresumably, the presence of a misleading statement in a pro-
spectus does not prevent it from being one which "meets the re-
quirements of section 10" within the meaning of § 5(b). Other-
wise every violation of § 17(a) as a result of a misleading
prospectus with respect to a registered security would automatically
involve a violation of § 5 (b) as well, and any buyer who had a
civil action in such a case under § 11 or § 12(2) would also have
one under § 12(1) on account of the violation of § 5. This does
not seem consistent with the statutory framework.3'
Despite the scheme of the Act, supported by its legislative his-
tory and commentary, the Manor court held truth to be a section
10(a) requirement. Under Manor therefore, use of a section 10(a)
30 Shulman, Civil Liabilities and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 243 (1933).
See also Shumen v. Sherman, 356 F. Supp. 911, 917 (D. Md. 1973), where the court
makes a similar point concerning section 12: "It is also to be noted that the very nature
of the underlying purposes of Sections 12 (1) and 12 (2) are dissimilar. Section 12 (1)
exists for the prophylactic purposes of insuring registration; Section 12(2) exists to
provide a remedy to a wronged purchaser ......
For early general discussions of the civil liabilities provisions of the Securities Act,
see Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE UJ. 171 (1933);
Feldman, The New Federal Securities Act, 14 BOsTON U.L REv. 1 (1934).
31 1 Loss 628. Professor Loss makes this statement in the course of discussing
whether an order suspending an exemption under regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-
.263 (1973), because of misleading or fraudulent statements in the sale of a security,
destroys the exemption ab initio or only as of the date of the order. If the exemption
is lost retroactively, the analogy to Manor is clear; if the exemption is lost only after the
suspension, however, previous buyers will have only antifraud remedies. The SEC has
used the former approach and found violations of both sections 5 and 17 as a result of
fraudulent sales literature. The section 5 violation in Manor follows logically from
that rationale. See Dinky's Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC L REP.
Y 79,170 (SEC 1973). See also Cooperative Oil Investments, Inc., [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 79,548 (SEC Oct. 18, 1973) (involving SEC Reg.
B, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.300-.346 (1973)). It is arguable, however, that the Commission's
power to condition exemptions pursuant to section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (b)
(1970), upon full compliance with its own rules is greater than that with respect to
section 5. See notes 73-76 infra and accompanying text.
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prospectus that contains an untruth32 is the equivalent of a failure
to deliver a section 10(a) prospectus at all. Thus, any sale action-
able under section 12(2) because of an untruth in a section 10(a)
prospectus will also result in a section 5 violation upon delivery
of the security and be actionable under section 12(1) as well. Since
section 12(1), unlike section 12(2), does not require the plaintiff
to prove his lack of knowledge of the fraud and does not permit
any due diligence defense, plaintiffs can be expected to sue under
section 12(1). Section 12(2) will be effectively read out of the
statute with respect to section 10(a) prospectuses.3 3
To the extent that Manor would permit section 12(1) actions
for untruths in prospectuses, it indirectly imposes absolute liability
on all sellers for the truth of the prospectuses they use.3 4  Yet in
other situations where the Act seeks to impose absolute liability -
in section 11 (for issuers) and for violations of section 5 - it does
so explicitly.35 Further, even though the fiduciary standard intended
32 Half-truths - omissions of material facts necessary to make other statements not
misleading - are presumably covered under Manor, since this type of misrepresentation
is generally actionable to the same extent as an affirmative misrepresentation. See, e.g.,
Securities Act §§ 11(a), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771(2) (1970). Pure
omissions, however, would probably not be actionable, except for those items that are
specifically required to be included in the prospectus. See Securities Act schedule A,
15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970), SEC Form S-1, and the general and special instructions to
SEC Form S-1. Omissions of those items, however, would not satisfy the matching re-
quirement of section 10(a) (1) and would constitute a section 5 violation apart from
Manor.
33 In cases in which the prospectus is delivered after sale and payment, but before
delivery of the security, section 12(1) liability may now exist where section 12(2)
liability would not. The language of section 12 (2), "offers or sells .. . by means of,"
suggests some relationship between the untruth and the fraud. It could be asserted that
a buyer who receives a faulty section 10(a) prospectus only upon delivery after an oral
sale and payment could not have relied on the prospectus; therefore, it was not sold
'by means of" the prospectus. However, courts have generally not required any re-
liance under section 12(2); so long as the buyer did not know of the untruth, he is
conclusively presumed to have relied on the prospectus. See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d
348, 356 (10th Cit. 1970); Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1968).
If the Manor decision is followed, no vestige of reliance - even buyer's knowledge -
will remain.
34 Although the court in Manor discusses the defendants' lack of good faith, knowl-
edge of some violations, and negligence with respect to others, 458 F.2d at 1094-97, it
does so only in connection with the section 17 (a) and Exchange Act section 10(b)
violations. In its discussion of the prospectus delivery violations, the court neither holds
nor implies that liability is contingent upon some degree of neglect or knowledge by
the defendants. Nor does the language of section 5 or 12(1) suggest such a reading.
Accordingly, Manor cannot be read as implying that some degree of guilty knowledge
is a requirement for liability under section 12 (1).
35Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970), provides: "[N]o person,
other than the issuer, shall be liable ...who shall sustain the burden of proof [of
enumerated defenses]." Violations of Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), are
not subject to defenses, as evidenced by the absolute language of section 12 (1). This
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by the drafters may be quite strict, it is harsh to place upon all
sellers36 absolute liability for all misstatements, particularly those
they neither made nor could have discovered.37  This liability is
especially burdensome since after Manor a seller, at the risk of abso-
lute liability, not only must make an initial preeffective date investi-
gation, but must continue to investigate during the entire period
of the distribution to insure that no posteffective developments im-
pair the validity of the prospectus.38
The Manor rationale could also affect a number of other pro-
spectuses now permitted by SEC rules. During the waiting period
SEC Rule 43339 permits a preliminary (priceless) prospectus to
qualify as a section 10 prospectus for the purpose of section 5 (b)
(1).40 An untruth in such a prospectus would, after Manor, disqual-
ify it as a section 10 prospectus and its use would then violate sec-
tion 5(b) (1).
Although Manor involved a section 10(a) prospectus, the court's
contrasts with section 12 (2), which expressly provides for a due diligence defense and
a purchaser's knowledge element. See note 24 supra.
36 The group of "persons who sell" under section 12 can encompass persons who
participate in the selling process on behalf of the person who actually transfers title.
See Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Hill York Corp. v. Amer-
ican Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1971); Lennerth v. Men-
denhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964); 3 Loss 1712-20; 6 Loss 3834-42 (Supp.
1969); accord, Neils v. Black & Co., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L REP. 5i 71,017 (D. Ore.
1972) (interpreting ORE. REv. STAT. § 59.115 (1971)). The concept of "participa-
tion," as it applies to section 12 (1), identifies persons who have promoted or encour-
aged a malum prohibitum sale. This is unlike the application of the same "participa-
tion" concept to section 12 (2), where there is a fault element (negligence) and where
the violator, because of the "by means of" language contained therein, must be some-
how tied into the misstatements. See 3 Loss 1716. But in the Manor situation, where
the prohibited act (violation of section 5) does not involve defective statements or
fault, it is arguable that participation should be based only upon substantial facilitation
of the illegal sale.
37 It is true that underwriters liable to purchasers under section 12 (1) are usually
indemnified by the issuer. See 3 Loss 1834-35. Such idemnification agreements may
not be enforceable, however. Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). See also Note to SEC Rule 460,
17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1973); Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions
and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of Barchris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681,
687-92 (1969).
The hardship of insuring a truthful prospectus from a distance is discussed in Don-
worth, A Review of the Securities Act of 1933, 8 WASH. L. REv. 61, 66 (1933).
a
8 This duty will extend so long as the seller must comply with section 5. For un-
derwriters, the duty will exist so long as they are acting in an underwriting capacity.
Dealers are subject to section 5 only for a period of 40 or 90 days, unless they trade in
securities constituting part of an unsold allotment. In that case, the dealer must con-
tinue to comply with section 5 until the allotment is disposed of. Securities Act § 4(3),
15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1970). See also SEC Rule 174, 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1973).
39 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (1973).
40 See 1 Loss 232-33.
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holding could be extended to Securities Act section 10(b),41 which
authorizes the SEC to provide by rule or regulation for the use of
summary prospectuses that will qualify as section 10 prospectuses
for purposes of section 5 (b) (1). If Manor were applied, prospec-
tuses currently permitted under SEC Rules 434 and 434A42 would
not qualify as section 10 prospectuses if incorrect, and their use
would violate section 5 (b) (1).
In addition, the Manor holding could reach other communica-
tions, including confirmations, which, because of the section 2(10)
(a) definitional exclusion,42 are not considered prospectuses under
certain conditions. If such a communication follows a prospectus
that fails to satisfy section 10 (a) because of the Manor truth require-
ment, then the communication itself will be a prospectus and its
use violative of section 5(b) (1). Similarly, a rule 134 "tomb-
stone,"44 excluded from status as a prospectus by section 2 (10) (b),
could lose its exclusion under the Manor approach. Both subsec-
tions (c) (ii) and (d) of rule 134 condition the allowability of a
tombstone upon the prior or simultaneous delivery of a section 10
prospectus. 45 If the user of a tombstone relies on subsection (c) (ii)
or (d), and the section 10(a) prospectus is untrue, the tombstone
would not satisfy the rule and it would be a prospectus whose use
would violate section 5(b) (1). Further, a possibility exists that a
court following Manor could conclude that, in addition to the truth
requirement applicable to the section 10 prospectus that operates
in the section 2(10) (a) exception and the rule 134(c) (ii) and (d)
situations, a truth requirement exists for the selling information it-
self. In that event, a false or misleading statement could constitute
a failure to comply with the provisions for exception, despite exis-
tence of a valid section 10(a) prospectus. The tombstone or sup-
plemental selling literature would then be a section 2(10) prospec-
tus, and its use would violate section 5(b) (1).
4115 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1970).
4217 C.F.R. §§ 230.434, .434a (1973).
43 Securities Act § 2(10) (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (a) (1970), provides in
part that:
[A] communication sent or given after the effective date of the registration
statement ... shall not be deemed a prospectus if it is proved that prior to
or at the same time with such communication a written prospectus meeting the
requirements of subsection (a) of section 10 at the time of such communica-
tion was sent or given to the person to whom the communication was
made ... .
4 4 SEC Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1973).
4 5 SEC Rules 13 4 (c) (ii), (d), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134(c) (ii), (d) (1973).
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Another possible Manor application exists if truth is read into
the section 7 requirements for a registration statement. By analogy
to Manor, the inaccurate registration statement would not be an ef-
fective section 7 statement; any offers would then violate section
5(c) and any sales would violate section 5(a) (1). However, Man-
or should be inapposite in the case of a registration statement be-
cause of the language of section 5. Sections 5(c) and 5(a) (1)
require only that a registration statement be filed with and declared
effective by the SEC. Once the SEC has allowed the statement to
become effective, it seems anomolous and unfair for it to argue that
there had not been compliance. In contrast, sections 5 (b) (1) and
5 (b) (2) contain specific qualitative requirements for a prospectus -
that it meet the requirements of section 10 and 10 (a) respectively.
Compliance with these requirements is not determined by the SEC;
it is therefore less inequitable to make an after the fact determina-
tion that the prospectus was invalid for purposes of section 5.
Furthermore, the application of Manor to a registration state-
ment serves to merge section 11 with section 12(1) and to read
the section 11 defenses out of the statute. Analogously to section
12(2), section 11 requires that the plaintiff not know of the untruth
or omission in the registration statement.46 But even this weak "re-
liance" requirement would be negated by the Manor approach; in
all cases in which the registration statement and prospectus were
untrue as of the effective date, plaintiffs would have a choice of
suing under section 12(1) or section 11, as well as section 12(2).?
Manor cites two cases for the proposition that "implicit in the
statutory provision that the prospectus contain certain information
46 Sections 11 and 12(2) differ in that under section 11 the burden is on the de-
fendant to prove that the plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission, so that lack of
reliance is a defense. By contrast, an element of the plaintiff's case under section 12(2)
is an allegation that he did not know of the untruth or omission. The difference in
reliance is apparent even more where the issuer has activated a further "reliance" re-
quirement by making a 12-month earning statement generally available to its security
holders. Section 11(a) concludes:
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at
least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration s'tate-
ment, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned
on proof that such person acquired the security relying upon such untrue
statement in the registration statement or relying upon the registration state-
ment and not knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such person.
Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
47The lack of any privity element in section 11 will continue to make it more at-
tractive than section 12 (1) where the defendant cannot be shown to have "sold," even
in the broad sense of that term. See note 36 supra.
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is the requirement that such information be true and correct."48 Both
cases may be criticized for contributing to the same confusion of
the section 12(1) and 12(2) remedies that Manor perpetuates. SEC
v. North American Finance Co.49 and Eugene Rosenson5 ° arose from
the same set of facts. The defendants Rosenson and Baumann orga-
nized the North American Finance Company to engage in the small
loan and consumer finance business. They became the principal
officers, directors, and owners of all voting stock of the company.
In 1956 they made a public offering of nonvoting stock. In the
prospectus filed as part of the registration statement, which became
effective in September of 1956, as well as in the prospectuses set
forth in several posteffective amendments, the defendants stated
falsely that the financial statements included in the registration state-
ment had been examined by an independent accountant.5 In fact,
the certifying accountant was also the principal bookkeeper for the
company and clearly not independent.52
Since both of these cases, like Manor, were actions instituted
by the SEC rather than by private plaintiffs, the District Court of
Arizona in North American and the SEC in Rosenson had no occa-
sion to consider the possible effect upon the section 12 dichotomy
of reading a truth requirement into section 10(a) . 3 North Ameri-
can, like Manor, was an SEC injunctive action; Rosenson was an
action for broker-dealer license revocation. The SEC has the power
to seek an injunction and to revoke a broker's registration in order
to prevent injury. Its power to seek injunctive relief arises
"[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is
engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute
48 458 F.2d at 1098.
49 214 F. Supp. 197 (D. Ariz. 1959).
5040 S.E.C. 948 (1961).
51 Securities Act schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970), in items 25 and 26, requires
that a balance sheet and an income statement certified by an independent public or cer-
tified accountant be submitted as part of the registration statement.
52 214 F. Supp. at 200. The defendants made a number of other misrepresentations
and misstatements. In North American the court found violations of Securities Act §§
17(a) (2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) (2)-(3) (1970), and Exchange Act § 15(c) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1970), and SEC Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15cl-2 (1973), as well as a section 5 (b) violation. In Rosenson, the SEC noted
violations of Securities Act § 17(a), Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 15(c) (1), and SEC
Exchange Act Rules 10b-5, 15cl-2. In addition, it found that the defendants had filed
untrue registration statements, amendments, and prospectuses in violation of Securities
Act §§ 7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (1970).
53 Rosenson and North American, like Manor, were cases of blatant and willful fraud
and would have been decided the same way, whether or not the tribunals had found that
section 10 requires that prospectuses be truthful. See note 34 supra.
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or will constitute a violation of the provisions of [the Securities
or Exchange Acts] or of any rule or regulation" thereunder. 4 Sim-
ilarly, Exchange Act section 15 (b) (5) (D) empowers the SEC to sus-
pend broker-dealer registration for any willful violation of the Se-
curities Act." By reading into the "directive" provisions of the
Ac5 standards like truthfulness, the SEC can better implement its
preventive policing function. Indeed, without such requirements,
it may be difficult for the Commission to enjoin the use of the mis-
leading documents until after the harm is done.5 7  Though this ap-
proach is inconsistent with the full disclosure-antifraud dichotomy,
it does aid the SEC in attacking potential violations in their incipi-
ency.5 8
On the other hand, the Securities Act gives private individuals
a remedy only after a violation has occurred. Hence, while Manor
and its predecessors reach effective and favorable results in terms
of SEC policing of the distribution process, their danger lies in their
having confused the scheme of the Act and the inequity to some
defendants that could result from the extension of the sweeping
holdings of these SEC injunctive cases to private actions.59 Accord-
5 4 Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Exchange Act § 21(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
55 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (D) (1970). This section also provides for revocation
for violations of the Exchange Act, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§
80b-1 to -21 (1970), the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52
(1970), and any rule or regulation under any of the enumerated statutes.
56 The "prohibitive" provisions of the Act - sections 5, 17, and 23, 15 U.S.C. §§
77e, 77q, 77w (1970) - are those which expressly provide that a specified act is un-
lawful. The other provisions of the Act concerning the registration statement or the
prospectus are merely "directive" or mandatory. See 1 Loss 181 n.3.
57Neither section 17(a) of the Securities Act nor section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act are commonly used as a basis for enjoining activity that will only later ripen into
violations of the Acts' mandatory provisions. But see note 58 infra. Section 15 (c) (4)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (4) (1970), also provides the Commission
with broad enforcement power, but it too does not provide the preventive relief neces-
sary to implement the SEC's policing function.
5 8 An alternate procedure for providing broad protection would be for the SEC to
base each injunctive complaint upon some prohibitive section of the Securities or the
Exchange Act or upon a rule or regulation thereunder that specifically declares an act
unlawful. Professor Loss, in taking this position, points out that sections 5 and 17 can
cover all Securities Act violations, and that "it is difficult to see how one can 'violate'
a provision.., that is purely remedial in nature." 4 Loss 2299 (Supp. 1969) .
If the prospectus and registration statement contain the same error, one other means
of attacking an untruthful prospectus exists. A section 8(d) stop order could be issued
by the SEC. A stop order, in halting effectiveness of the registration statement, reaches
the prospectus as well.
59 One district court in the Second Circuit has applied the Manor rationale to a
private cause of action. In Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), a case arising out of the Equity Funding scandal, the defendant di-
rector and vice president allegedly sold his securities based on inside knowledge that
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ingly, even if the SEC is permitted to require truthfulness to imple-
ment its policing function, such power should not be cross-transfer-
able to private suits since, if section 10 can be "violated," then a
section 5 violation and section 12(1) liability must follow.
As a second source of authority Manor cites "analogous situa-
tions under the 1934 Act" in which "the SEC has held that the
statutory provision that records be kept and that reports be filed
... embodies the requirement that such records and reports be true
and correct.''60 The SEC proceedings cited by the court"' were
based on Exchange Act Rules 17a-3 and 17a-5, which require cer-
tain exchange members, brokers, and dealers to maintain records
and file reports. 62  Three characteristics differentiate these SEC deci-
sions from the situation in Manor. First, since the Exchange Act
rules which were at issue call for specific information to be included
in the records and reports, false statements can arguably be said
not to comply. In contrast, the simple directive of section 10(a)
that one document match another does not so easily lend itself to
the imposition of an additional qualitative requirement.63  Further,
rule 17a-5, the only rule involved that actually requires reports kept
by broker-dealers to be filed with the Commission, specifically calls
for "an oath or affirmation that, to the best knowledge and belief
of the person making such oath or affirmation . . . the financial
statement and supporting schedules are true and correct .... .64
the fraudulent activity of the company would soon become public. In addition to find-
ing that a cause of action existed under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, Judge Gurfein noted
that even though there was a valid registration in effect for the shares involved, "material
omissions and misstatements tin the prospectus] would give rise to a claim under § 12
based on a violation of § 5 of the 1933 Act. S.E.C. v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc."
357 F. Supp. at 1215. Here, as in Manor, it was unlikely that the defendant would have
been able to successfully assert a due diligence defense. 357 F. Supp. at 1216. Thus,
relief could have been obtained under section 12(2). See note 53 supra. The real
question presented by Manor - whether a defendant with a valid section 12(2) de-
fense can nevertheless be held under section 12 (1) - still remains.
60 458 F.2d at 1098 n.22.
61Talmadge Wilcher, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 936 (1960); Hermand Bud Rothbard, 39
S.E.C. 253 (1960); Pilgrim Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 172 (1959); Lowell Niebuhr &
Co., 18 S.E.C. 471 (1945).
62 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, -5 (1973).
63 When tied to schedule A via section 7, the section 10 matching requirement ap-
pears to be analogous to the requirements of section 17 of the Exchange Act. But ad-
hering strictly to the analogy, it would seem that a truth requirement would more prop-
erly inhere in section 7 than in section 10, because it is section 7, like section 17 of the
Exchange Act, that dictates that specific information be included. As noted before,
however, imposing a truth requirement upon the registration statement is even more
problematic than the imposition of such a requirement upon the prospectus. See text
accompanying note 46 supra.
64 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(b) (2) (i) (1973). Unlike section 12(1) of the Se-
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Section 10(a) has no similar requirement."5  Finally, and perhaps
most critically, the assertion that the rules under section 17(a) of
the Exchange Act contain an implicit truth requirement may be the
only means by which the SEC can attack incorrect filings or reports,
since these records and reports may not be influencing investors to
make purchases and sales of securities.66 In contrast, an untruthful
prospectus will violate one of the antifraud provisions when used. 7
The statutory framework of the Securities and Exchange Acts, as
well as the different purposes of section 10(a) of the Securities Act
and section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, make any analogy between
the two tenuous.
The court in Manor also cited GAF Corp. v. Milstein8 for the
proposition that the reporting requirement of section 13(d) of the
Exchange Act69 includes an implicit requirement of truth. The SEC
does take the position that filings made pursuant to Exchange Act
section 13 are in violation of the filing requirement if they are false
or misleading. As with Exchange Act section 17, however, the
curities Act, Exchange Act Rule 17a-5 has a good faith defense; the oath to be taken
pursuant to this rule only requires that the information be true to the best of the affir-
mant's knowledge. In the proceedings cited by the court, the SEC found willful viola-
tions of Exchange Act section 17 (a); Manor would impose liability regardless of intent
or knowledge. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. See also 71 MIc-L L REV.
591, 594 n.20 (1973). It is true, however, that the Commission or a court, following
the Manor rationale, could find a violation of rule 17a-5, despite the affirmant's good
faith, by applying the good faith standard only to the oath and holding the report to a
higher standard.
65 The only "truth" requirement that could be said to be statutorily based is Secu-
rities Act Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230A08 (1973), which states, "In addition to the in-
formation expressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be
added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the re-
quired statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading." This rule, however, is promulgated pursuant to section 7 of the Securities
Act, not section 10, and therefore does not provide directly for a truthful prospectus.
Through the section 10(a) (1) directive that the two documents contain the same in-
formation, however, rule 408 may be said to require that a prospectus be truthful.
66The Exchange Act contains no general prohibition against defective filings.
Therefore, even the approach suggested in note 58 supra, that the SEC premise each
injunction on a prohibitive antifraud provision of the Securities or Exchange Act, would
not be possible. No sale is imminent, and therefore no prohibitive section of either
act (for example, Securities Act section 17(a) or Exchange Act Rule lOb-5) would be
applicable.
67 In addition, as noted in 71 MIcH. L REv. 591, 594 n.20 (1973), the liability
for failure to comply with the Exchange Act section 17 (a) requirement that the report
be truthful is imposed directly upon the broker-dealer responsible for the misrepresenta-
tion. Manor, however, may create liability under section 12(1) against those who
neither knew nor could have discovered the untruth.
68453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971).
69 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
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analogy to Manor is questionable.7 0  First, section 13 is not self-
executing; rather, it gives the Commission full power to condition
its observance. Second, there are rules expressly mandating the
truth and completeness of filings under section 13. 7' Finally, until
the Commission can show that a report is about to influence sales
or purchases, the general antifraud provisions of the two acts are
unavailable. The court in Milstein, which used this rule to give the
plaintiff corporation standing to sue, noted that this approach pro-
vided the only effective means by which the incorrect filing could
be attacked.72
Securities Act section 10(b), which allows the SEC to permit
use of a summary prospectus, gives the SEC more control than does
section 10(a). Accordingly, an analogy of section 10(b) to Ex-
change Act sections 13 and 17 is sharper. This same comparison,
in even more cogent terms, can be made with respect to the regula-
tion A exemption 73 created pursuant to Securities Act section 3(b).7
SEC Rule 252(a), the implementing provision of regulation A,
makes available an exemption from registration if the terms and
conditions of the regulation are followed. 75  One of these terms,
rule 256(e), requires that the offering circular not be false or mis-
leading.76  Therefore, since using a false and misleading circular
would constitute noncompliance with the terms of regulation A, the
exemption would be lost and section 5 violated.
Although the Manor court did not mention it, Securities Act
section 10(a) (3)77 provides some support for the court's holding.
Section 10(a) (3) provides that when a prospectus is used more than
9 months after the effective date of the registration statement, its
contents must be correct as of a date not more than 16 months
past. Since section 10(a) (3) specifically calls for information to
be added to the prospectus to keep it current and exempts it from
70 See notes 61-66 supra and accompanying text.
71 See SEC Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1973); SEC Ex-
change Act Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1973). For a detailed discussion
of the section 13 reporting requirements, see Rowe, Administration and Enforcement of
the Periodic Reporting Provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 OKLA. L
REv. 157 (1972).
72453 F.2d at 720 n.22.
73 See note 31 supra.
74 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970). Section 3(b) is not self-executing; rather, it per-
mits the SEC through its rules or regulations to grant exemptions from registration.
75 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (1973).
7 6 SEC Rule 25 6 (e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 6 (e) (1973).
7715 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (3) (1970).
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the section 10(a) (1) requirement of compliance with the registra-
tion statement, it might be said that the whole of section 10 is
directed not only toward a prospectus that mirrors the registration
statement, but also toward one that is true. The Manor holding
would thus make more sense in the section 10(a) (3) context than
it does with respect to section 10 (a) (1) .-
Because the Manor court determined that the defendants had
violated several of the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Ex-
change Acts, 70 its holding that section 10(a) requires the informa-
tion in a prospectus to be true was not essential to the outcome
of the case. It may be, however, that the court has stated a rule
that will provide harsh results in a civil suit whenever a seller could
otherwise successfully defend against a section 11 or a section 12(2)
attack. The antifraud sections of the Act were designed to prevent
misrepresentations; the registration and prospectus delivery sections
were intended to insure that full disclosure was provided in a struc-
tured manner and in the form on file with, and reviewed by, the
SEC. By mixing these two functions, the Manor court reads the
characteristics of the antifraud remedy out of the statute. And, as
will be shown, the harshness of this rule is compounded by the
court's holding concerning posteffective events.
III. As OF WHAT DATE THE
PROSPECTUS MUST SPEAK
A. Application of the Truthfulness Requirement to Posteffective
Developments
The events that caused the Manor prospectus to become untrue
noncash sales, extra compensation paid to participants in the of-
fering, failure to hold funds in escrow, and breach of the all-or-
nothing condition of the offering - all occurred after the registra-
tion statement became effective. 0 The defendants maintained that
7 8 See 1 Loss 295.
79 See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
80 The court might have been able to find that the prospectus was untrue as of the
effective date of the registration statement and thus have avoided extending the truth
requirement it found in section 10(a) (1) into the posteffective period. The prospectus
falsely represented that arrangements for escrow of the proceeds had already been made,
458 F.2d at 1090. Further, the posteffective sales practices might have been evidence
that the statements were false when they were made. Cf. note 108 infra and accom-
panying text. The SEC argued in its brief, "[E]ven if it were assumed that, for purposes
of section 5(b) (2), the accuracy of the prospectus is to be determined solely as of the
effective date of the registration statement, it is clear that the Manor prospectus was ma-
terially false and misleading as of its effective date and thus failed to meet the require-
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section 5 (b) (2) does not require that a prospectus be amended or
supplemented to reflect material events8 that occur after the effec-
tive date of the registration statement.82 They contended that a
prospectus that is true as of the effective date of the registration
statement complies with section 10(a) and is not in violation of
section 5 (b) (2). The court held, however, that to comply with sec-
tion 5 (b) (2) the prospectus must be truthful as of the date it is
used. 3
1. The Preeffective-Posteffective Dichotomy
Prior to the Manor decision, posteffective developments were
disclosed in a prospectus only to avoid liability under the antifraud
provisions.84 Neither the courts nor the SEC had held sellers re-
sponsible for posteffective events in order to satisfy the prospectus
delivery requirements. However the Manor holding now ties post-
effective developments to Securities Act sections 10(a) (1) and 5(b)
(2). The court's decision that a prospectus must be truthful during
the posteffective period to comply with sections 10 (a) and 5 (b) (2)
is problematic; not only was it unnecessary in this case in view of
Manor's antifraud violations, but it also rests on unconvincing au-
thority. More importantly, the court did not decide how the prospec-
tus should be updated, and the possibility exists that the registration
ments of section 10(a)." Brief for Appellee at 48, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). It is clear, however, that the Commission now
feels it can attack developments that both originate and are carried out in the post-
effective period. See Lloyd D. Sahley, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC L. REP.
5 79,562 (SEC Nov. 1, 1973).
81 The requirement of materiality assumed by Manor is not found in sections 10 (a),
5(b), or 12(1). See note 27 supra. The court appears to be carrying it over from
section 12(2). See note 24 supra. It has been suggested that courts following Manor
may read the elements of actions in fraud into section 12(1). See 48 IND. L.J. 464,
471-72 (1973).
82 458 F.2d at 1099. The court's use of the word "amended" is somewhat confus-
ing. "Amending" refers here to any additions or changes in the prospectus, rather than
to a part of the formal amendment procedure of Securities Act § 8(c), 15 U.S.C. §
77h(c) (1970). On the other hand, when the court speaks of a "sticker amendment,"
458 F.2d at 1092, it does mean a formal amendment pursuant to section 8(c) rather
than the sticker which is simply affixed to a prospectus. See text accompanying note
94 infra.
83 458 F.2d at 1100. Earlier, the court noted:
That these developments occurred after the effective date of the registration
statement did not provide a license to appellants to ignore them. Post-effec-
tive developments which materially alter the picture presented in the registra-
tion statement must be brought to the attention of public investors.
Id. at 1095 (footnote omitted).
84 See notes 94-98 infra and accompanying text.
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statement itself will now have to be amended whenever a material
event occurs in the posteffective period.
Two different types of situations necessitate posteffective changes
in a prospectus: (1) the discovery of a material fact that existed
but was unknown as of the effective date of the registration state-
ment; and (2) the discovery of a material event that occurred in
the posteffective period.8 5 Two different procedures had developed
for disclosing these changes. Facts that existed before effectiveness
were disclosed by amending the registration statement pursuant to
section 8(c) of the Securities Act.86  Posteffective events were dis-
closed by a sticker which was merely affixed to the prospectus; this
stickering process did not affect the registration statement, but did
serve to notify prospective purchasers of the changes and thereby
avoid antifraud liability. 7
The existence of a material defect in the registration statement
as of its effective date subjects the issuer (and others) to liability
under section 11.88 To avoid this liability, issuers amend the regis-
tration statement pursuant to section 8(c).89 Failure to do so may
also result in a stop order, pursuant to section 8(d).'O Since both
section 11 and section 8(d) require that the registration statement
be true as of its effective date,9 ' a section 8(c) amendment must
8 5 This distinction was first discussed by the SEC in Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6
(1934). See also 1 Loss 293.
86 15 U.S.C. § 77h(c) (1970).
8 7 See 1 Loss 293. Under SEC Rule 424(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.424(c) (1973),
an issuer need only file 25 copies of the stickered prospectus with the Commission be-
fore it is used. See note 119 infra.
8 8 Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970):
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effec-
tive, contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a ma-
terial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security ... may... sue
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of... or partner in, the issuer at
the time of filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to
which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration state-
ment as being or about to become a director ... or partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose pro-
fession gives authority to a statement made by him... ;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
89 Typically, issuers and sellers will also offer rescission to those who have already
bought, since the section 11 liability will always exist as to these buyers.
90 Securities Act § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970). The impact of a stop order
is that the registration statement is no longer effective, and no offers or sales can be
made.
91 Though section 11 clearly requires that the registration statement be true only as
of its effective date, there is some dispute about the date as of which the registration
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be used to remedy the defective registration statement.9 2  As a part
of this procedure the issuer also corrects the prospectus, so that it
contains the same information as the registration statement in ac-
cordance with section 10(a) (1). This correction of the prospectus
will also make it truthful, and thereby avert liability under the anti-
fraud provisions. Failure to deliver such a corrected prospectus by
the time the security is delivered will cause a violation of section
5(b) (2), since the prospectus no longer satisfies the matching re-
quirements of section 10(a), and in a private suit make the seller
liable under section 12(1). 3  Thus, although there is no explicit
statutory requirement for a formal amendment to the prospectus,
an issuer in this situation ends up correcting the prospectus so that
it contains the information found in the registration statement.
Events that occur after the effective date of the registration state-
ment traditionally have been treated differently from those that ex-
isted as of the effective date. Typically, additions have been made
by stickering the prospectus, and the registration statement has not
been amended. This process protects sellers from liability for
fraud94 unless the sticker is itself false or misleading.9" Since section
statement must speak for purposes of section 8(d). Section 8(d) authorizes a stop
order if "it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration statement in-
cludes any untrue statement of a material fact." The House Report suggests that the
SEC can issue a stop order to require the issuer to disclose posteffective developments:
In determining whether a stop order should issue, the Commission will
naturally have regard to the facts as they then exist and will stop the further
sale of securities, even though the registration statement was true when made
... [and] ... has become untrue or misleading by reason of subsequent de-
velopments.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1933).
In Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6 (1934), however, the SEC interpreted the words
at any time" to modify "appears" rather than "includes"; therefore, a stop order could
not issue for an event that had occurred in the posteffective period. This view, held by
the SEC since 1934, aligns sections 8 (d) and 11. See note 98 infra and accompanying
text. Though the Manor court does not decide the issue directly, it is clear that it
believes the House interpretation to be controlling. See 458 F.2d at 1099 n.24; 1 Loss
293.
92 A posteffective amendment will also be required for disclosure of an event that
occurred during the waiting period. Kinner Airplane & Motor Corp., 2 S.E.C. 943,
951 (1937); Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 9 (1934).
A sticker or other communication would not avoid problems under section 8(d),
but it could reduce liability under section 11 by enabling the issuer to prove that sub-
sequent purchasers "knew of [the] untruth or omission" in the registration statement
at the time of their purchase.
93 Use of an incorrect prospectus in this situation will also violate section 5 (b) (1),
since the prospectus will not be a section 10 prospectus. See note 16 supra.
94 The relevant federal antifraud provisions are Securities Act §§ 12 (2), 17 (a), and
SEC Exchange Act Rule lOb-5. See Danser v. United States, 281 F.2d 492, 496-97 (1st
Cir. 1960); SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 n.10 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6 (1934). See also 1 LOSS 293. The Manor
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11 requires that the registration statement speak only as of its effec-
tive date,96 and, since stop orders have not been used by the SEC
to respond to posteffective events,97 no change to the registration
statement has been deemed necessary. A 1933 release of the Feder-
al Trade Commission, predecessor to the SEC in the administration
of the Securities Act, took the position that a registration statement
need not be amended to disclose posteffective events; 98 until Manor,
the SEC maintained that position. But, as will be discussed,9 9 the
Manor court's holding that the defendants had a duty under the
full disclosure provisions of the Act to update the prospectus 10 may
result in creating a duty to amend the registration statement as well.
In summary, a posteffective discovery of a preeffective fact not
in the registration statement must be disclosed by an amendment
to the registration statement; a sticker traditionally sufficed to dis-
close posteffective events. Though it could have required amend-
ment to the registration statement for posteffective events,1 1 the
court seems to recognize that the antifraud provisions require the prospectus to disclose
posteffective developments:
The effect of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act (§ 17 (a))
and of the Exchange Act (§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5) is to require the pro-
spectus to reflect any . st-effective changes necessary to keep the prospectus
from being misleading in any material respect ....
458 F.2d at 1096. Nevertheless, the court holds that the same disclosure of posteffec-
tive developments is demanded by the prospectus delivery requirements. Id. at 1098.
9 5 See 1 Loss 293.
96 1 Loss 290-91. See note 88 supra.
97 See note 91 supra. But see note 109 infra.
98 FTC Securities Act Release No. 97 (Dec. 28, 1933):
Under section 11 the accuracy of the registration statement is to be judged
by the date upon which it becomes effective. It is, therefore, unnecessary, and
probably impossible, to amend it to include facts which occur after its effec-
tive date. It may, of course, be necessary to supplement the information con-
tained in the prospectus in order that it may not be misleading within the
meaning of sections 12(2) and 17.
The use of supplementary information, however, does not require an
amendment of the prospectus, and no further papers need, therefore, be filed
with the Commission. On the other hand, if it is proposed to substitute new
information for that contained in the prospectus, since under the rules of the
Commission the prospectus must not omit certain items contained in the regis-
tration statement, such changes can be effected only by a regular amendment
filed with the Commission ....
See also 1 Loss 291.
09 Text accompanying note 119 infra.
0 0 See note 83 supra. The court also stated that "there is no authority for the prop-
osition that a prospectus speaks always as of the effective date of the registration state-
ment." 458 F.2d at 1099. As noted in 71 MICH. L. REv. 591, 599 (1973), "[t~his
means that the prospectus must meet a higher standard of truthfulness than the regis-
tration statement, which under sections 8(d) and 11 must be truthful only as of the
effective date."
101 The SEC could have accomplished this (1) by reading section 10(a) (1) to
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SEC preferred to test the prospectus content only as of the effective
date for purposes of sections 5 and 8.102 The sticker served to avoid
the inconvenience and expense of the formal amendment procedure;
it raised no problems under section 10(a) (1), 8(d), or 11, and by
disclosing new developments it avoided fraud. Before the Manor
decision then, it was necessary to reflect posteffective developments
only to avoid antifraud liability and not to meet the prospectus de-
livery requirements.
2. The Manor Court's Approach
The Manor court had no case law squarely supporting its hold-
ing that sections 5 (b) (2) and 10(a) require that the prospectus be
amended as events occur after the effective date. The court used
Charles A. Howard, an early SEC decision that held that a stop
order would not issue because of posteffective events.10 3  The court
pointed to language in Howard to the effect that even though the
registration statement need not be amended to disclose posteffective
events, the seller is under a duty to disclose such changes in the
prospectus. 04  In Howard, however, the SEC stated that posteffec-
tive events must be disclosed only to escape liability under sections
12(2) and 17(a).'05 Howard provides no authority, therefore, for
the proposition that a prospectus delivery violation will occur be-
cause of posteffective events that make the prospectus materially
misleading.
Manor also quoted from Franchard Corp.,06 a 1964 SEC re-
lease, in which the SEC said that supplementing the prospectus "is
inadequate and misleading when numerous changes in the issuer's
affairs . . . have clearly outdated the prospectus.' 0 7  This release
does not help the Manor court's position, however. In Franchard
require that the prospectus plus any sticker include only the information contained in
the registration statement, see discussion at text accompanying notes 112-13 infra znd
at text accompanying notes 118-19 infra, or (2) by rule, pursuant to its power under
Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970), to make, amend, and rescind any
rules necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. Alternatively, the Commission
could have forced amendments by interpreting section 8 (d) so that "at any time" mod-
ifies "includes" rather than "appears." See note 91 supra. Then, posteffective events
could have formed the basis for stop order proceedings; the threat of a stop order in
turn would force amendment of the registration statement.
10 2 See 1 Loss 294.
103 1 S.E.C. 6 (1934).
104 458 F.2d at 1099.
105 1 S.E.C. at 10.
106 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964).
107 458 F.2d at 1099 n.23.
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an issuer sought to file a posteffective amendment to correct state-
ments that were untrue as of the effective date of the registration
statement. 0 8  Therefore mere changes in the prospectus would not
have been sufficient; an amendment to the registration statement
was mandatory. The issue in Franchard concerned only the format
of a posteffective amendment; the SEC held that the prospectus por-
tion of each amendment was unclear when it contained merely the
old prospectus and a supplement. Franchard did not discuss the
inadequacy of supplementing the prospectus as opposed to amending
the registration statement in terms of reflecting posteffective events,
or even the need to reveal posteffective developments at all. Fran-
chard held only that once there had been established a need to
amend to correct preeffective error, the posteffective amendment
may not be effected merely by supplementing an earlier prospectus.
Franchard offers little support for the proposition that posteffective
developments must appear in the prospectus for purposes of section
10(a) (1) or that posteffective developments ever need be disclosed
in the registration statement.10 9
108 The Commission noted:
We reject registrants contention that this finding cannot be made because
there is no direct evidence with respect to Glickman's [registrant's president)
state of mind on the effective date of the 1960 filing. In view of the brevity
of the time interval - two days - and the absence of countervailing evi-
dence, we consider it reasonable to infer that Glickman intended to divert
proceeds from registrant's offering on that date.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710, n.15 (July 31, 1964). This argument is further
buttressed by the Commission's discussion of section 11 liability; reference to this sec-
tion indicates a material defect as of the effective date.
109 The Manor court appears to have confused the "supplementation of the out-
moded prospectus" that the defendant in Franchard attempted to use as a posteffective
amendment, and the "supplement versus substitute" distinction applicable to prospec-
tuses. See 1 Loss 294. A prospectus is usually stickered by adding to (supplement-
ing) the earlier prospectus. When this procedure creates a misleading prospectus, a
section 12(2) violation may ensue. Therefore, if the sticker is inadequate to disclose
facts clearly, an issuer, to present a dearer document, will substitute rather than supple-
ment. This substitution creates a mismatch between the prospectus and the registration
statement; accordingly, the issuer must formally amend the registration statement in
order to comply with section 10(a) (1), even if section 10(a) (1) means only that
the prospectus must contain at least the information found in the registration statement.
(The alternative interpretations of section 10(a) (1) are discussed at notes 112-14 infra
and accompanying text.) The need to amend here is a product of the decision to sub-
stitute rather than supplement, a different situation from one like Franchard, in which
the need to modify or substitute rather than supplement was necessary to avoid "an
obscure and uncoordinated presentation" of a posteffective amendment.
The reliance upon Franchard may also be attributable to the Commission's position
regarding the requirements for filing posteffective amendments. The SEC argued that
"where an issuer willfully changes the basic terms of an offering, a supplement or sticker
simply will not suffice." Brief for Appellee at 48, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). According to the Commission, it does not matter
that the changes took place in the posteffective period; nor, presumably, would it matter
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B. Effects of Manor Upon the Updating Procedure
The court in Manor stated that it "[did] not reach the question
whether merely supplementing the prospectus would have been ade-
quate in the instant case.""'  Yet the major impact of the Manor
decision lies in the answer to this question, for under the Manor
rationale, it may well be that stickering will never be a sufficient
response to posteffective developments, and that the registration
statement will have to be amended in every case.
A reasonable reading of the Manor decision indicates that sec-
tion 10(a) (1) now requires that the prospectus contain the infor-
mation in the registration statement, that such information be cor-
rect, and that it be correct up to the time it is used. Given such
a reading, all posteffective developments would have to be disclosed
in the prospectus to satisfy the truth requirement of action 10(a)
(1).
One interpretation of Manor and section 10(a) (1) combined is
that section 10(a) (1) should be read as requiring that the prospec-
tus contain the information contained in the registration statement,
plus any supplemental information necessary to make the prospec-
tus true and not misleading up to the time of sale. Any disclosure
of a posteffective event could be regarded as merely supplemen-
tal."' This reading of Manor would allow compliance through the
same stickering process an issuer would normally employ to avoid
liability for fraud as material posteffective events occur. The validity
of such a reading, however, depends upon the determination of two
subsidiary questions: (1) whether a prospectus must satisfy not only
whether the changes could be clearly effected by a sticker. It appears, therefore, that
the Commission is attempting to implement a new policy whereby the importance of
the changes or the willfulness with which they were effected rather than the manner and
clarity with which they can be presented will determine whether a sticker is adequate
or an amendment is required. No statutory authority supports either factor as a basis
for requiring an amendment; the SEC brief states, however, "Under such circumstances
it is clear that no unnecessary burden is imposed in requiring an amendment of the
registration statement and prospectus .... " Id. at 49. The Commission, in attempting
to reconcile its position with previous SEC policy, tries to carve out an exception for
voluntary and substantial changes in the posteffective period. In arguing that no "un-
necessary burden" exists in this case, the SEC appears to be distinguishing it from the
general situation, presented in the 1933 release, in which no amendment need be filed.
See note 98 supra and accompanying text. The 1933 release, however, does not focus
on the word "unnecessary," and it is doubtful that the Commission (in 1933, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission) intended the release to be so interpreted.
In addition, the SEC brief cites Franchard and Kinner Airplane & Motor Corp., 2
S.E.C. 943, 951 (1937), but both discuss changes that took place before the effective
date and are therefore inapposite.
110 458 F.2d at 1099 n.23.
Ill See note 109 supra.
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the language of section 10(a) but its converse as well; and '(2) how
a post-Manor sticker fits into the statutory process.
On its face, section 10(a) (1) seems to demand only that the
prospectus include at least the information contained in the registra-
tion statement. The converse of section 10(a) (1) would require
that the registration statement contain the information in the pro-
spectus, or, put another way, that the prospectus include only the
information contained in the registration statement."2  Professor
Loss states that "the Commission has assumed that the converse [of
section 10(a)] is true." 1 3 But his cited authority does not substan-
tiate that proposition," 4 and it is not a legitimate, logical step to
infer that the converse of a statement must be true. If the registra-
tion statement need not have all the information that is in the pro-
spectus, it should be possible to allow a prospectus to contain both
the information contained in the registration statement and any sup-
plemental information necessary to satisfy the truthfulness require-
ment read into section 10(a) (1) by the Manor decision. This sup-
plemental information or sticker, though clearly not part of the reg-
istration statement, could make the statutory prospectus satisfactory
under the Manor court's interpretation of section 10 (a) (1). Whether
such an interpretation could be sustained, however, depends upon
the exact nature of the sticker or supplement.
A sticker by itself normally would not meet the section 10
requirements. It could, however, be considered a separate prospec-
112 This proposition would apply only to the items in schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1970), that are found in both the prospectus and the registration statement. Items
28 through 32 appear only in the registration statement; the prospectus need not dis-
close these facts or any changes with respect to them.
113 1 Loss 294.
"4 Professor Loss cites FTC Securities Act Release No. 97 (Dec. 28, 1933), as
showing that the Commission has assumed the converse of section 10(a) to be true.
The release states:
The use of supplementary information, however, does not require an
amendment of the prospectus, and no further papers need be filed with the
Commission. On the other hand, if it is proposed to substitute new informa-
tion for that contained in the prospectus, since under the rules of the Com-
mission the prospectus must not omit certain items contained in the registra-
tion statement, such changes can be effected only by a regular amendment to
the statement filed with the Commission ....
This statement does not appear to support the converse of section 10(a); it merely re-
states the section 10(a) (1) requirement itself. By substituting new information
rather than merely supplementing, the issuer changes the prospectus so that it no longer
includes the information contained in the registration statement and thereby fails to
comply with section 10(a). The release does not state that a prospectus that includes
all the information in the registration statement may not contain other information as
well.
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tus as defined in section 2(10) 11 and therefore be subject to the
section 5 (b) (1) prohibition against the use of any prospectus after
the filing date except a valid section 10 prospectus. Under the pre-
Manor view, the sticker did not cause a section 5 violation because
it was accompanied by (in fact attached to) a valid section 10(a)
prospectus and therefore was excluded by section 2(10) (a) from the
definition of prospectus. 116 Thus, no separate statutory definition
for a sticker was ever needed. The Commission could have its cake
and eat it, too; it could say that the prospectus must contain only
the matter found in the registration statement and allow stickering,
because the sticker was not part of the prospectus, but rather a writ-
ten offer that did not run afoul of section 5 (b) (1) because it escaped
prospectus status under section 2(10) (a). Under the Manor hold-
ing, however, this supplemental information is necessary to make
the original prospectus satisfy section 10(a) (1). Therefore, only a
bootstrap approach would simultaneously allow (1) the prospectus
to be valid under section 10(a) (as elaborated by Manor) because
it is completed by the sticker, and (2) the sticker to be excluded
from the definition of prospectus (and therefore nonviolative of sec-
tion 5(b) (1) ) because it is accompanied by a valid section 10(a)
prospectus. 117
A possible solution to this dilemma that would allow a court
following the Manor rationale to permit stickering is to consider
the sticker as an integral part of the section 10(a) prospectus, with-
out deeming it a separate "prospectus" under section 2(10). This
characterization of the sticker serves to avoid amending the registra-
tion statement, however, only if it is assumed that the converse of
section 10(a) (1) is not true: that the registration statement need
not contain all the information in the section 10(a) (1) prospectus.""
L15 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970).
116 Securities Act § 2(10) (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (a) (1970) states that:
[A] communication sent or given after the effective date of the registration
statement.., shall not be deemed a prospectus if it is proved that prior to or
at the same time with such communication a written prospectus meeting the
requirements of subsection (a) of section 10 at the time of such communica-
tion was sent or given to the person to whom the communication was
made ....
See 1 Loss 249-51.
117 Without such an interpretation, a seller wishing to use what he believes to be
supplemental selling literature also risks a section 5 violation if the prospectus that
accompanies or precedes the supplemental selling literature is untrue and does not there-
fore comply with section 10(a) (1). In that event, the would-be section 2(10) (a)
literature will lose its nonprospectus status and will become a section 2 (10) "prospec-
tus"; its delivery will violate section 5 (b) (1).
118 Securities Act § 10(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(c) (1970), which states that "any pro-
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Thus, if the Commission insists that the converse of section 10(a)
(1) is correct, the effect of Manor may well be that corrective ma-
terial disclosing posteffective changes must be filed as a posteffective
amendment to the registration statement." 9 But if the converse of
section 10(a) (1) is not true, and if the sticker is not considered to
be a prospectus separate from the document to which it is attached,
disclosure by stickering the prospectus should suffice.'20
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding by the Manor court that a prospectus must be
truthful up to the date of use to satisfy section 10(a) (1) appears
to be both inconsistent with the framework of the Securities Act
and exceedingly harsh upon users of prospectuses.
If applied to private actions, Manor will create section 12(1)
liability in all cases in which a section 10(a) prospectus contains
any misstatement or half-truth. In cases of preeffective error, this
section 12(1) liability will supplement any possible section 11 or
12(2) liability; for posteffective error, it will serve in addition to
section 12(2) .1'2 Defendants will have no opportunity to defend,
as they would under section 12(2) or 11, since liability is virtually
absolute under section 12(1). Also, the defendant group under sec-
tion 12(1) may be different from the defendants under section
12(2).122
Manor may also require that all disclosures of material events
in prospectuses be filed as posteffective amendments to the registra-
spectus shall contain such other information as the Commission may by rules or regu-
lations require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors," could authorize a rule that would permit a prospectus to contain
information in addition to that contained in the registration statement. And SEC Rule
434c, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434c (1973), specifically permits a Japanese prospectus used in
Japan to include certain information additional to that contained in a registration state-
ment.
119 SEC Rule 4 24 (c), 17 C.F.R. § 230. 4 24 (c) (1973), which requires that 25
copies of any "prospectus which purports to comply with section 10 of the act and
which varies from any form of prospectus filed" with the registration statement, ap-
pears to be grounded upon the premise that a valid prospectus may contain information
not contained in the registration statement. Manor plus the converse of section 10(a)
(1) would render rule 424(c) obsolete; a prospectus varying from the registration
statement could not "purport to comply with section 10."
12 0 See notes 39-45 supra and accompanying text.
121The section 12(1) remedy after Manor may also overlap with other antifraud
provisions: Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); Exchange Act § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
1 22 See notes 28, 36 supra.
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tion statement. If the Manor holding is followed, it will greatly
change current practices of disclosure of posteffective events.
MITCHELL B. DUBICK
